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How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which
fiction threatens our world? The answer is: One can reduce it
with the author. The author allows a limitation of the cancerous
and dangerous proliferation of significations within a world where
one is thrifty not only with one's resources and riches, but also
with one's discourses and their significations. The author is the
principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning.
Michel Foucault, W'hat Is An Author '
INTRODUCTION

For a brief period in the nineteen seventies it became fashionable
to write thrillers in which there was no central narrator, merely a
collection of official and unofficial documents out of which the story
would appear, apparently rising to the surface of the text under its
own power. The briefs and opinions which follow in this volume
could be seen in the same light. Unfortunately, the narrative is a
rather bare one. There is a controversy over the true identity of
Shakespeare, a controversy notable for the intemperate statements
to which it gives rise. Three Supreme Court Justices agree to hear a
staged oral argument on the issue. Briefs are written, and replies.
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(These you have.) There is a televised oral argument. (This you do
not have.) The court decides in favor of the traditional claimant to
Shakespeare's laurels, each Justice rendering a separate opinion.
(The opinions, too, are provided.) The attorneys retire in some
confusion, unaccustomed to the importance they are presumed by
their audience to possess. The parties disperse, already arguing
over the significance of the ruling.
Apart from the rather bizarre subject matter, the media attention
and the eminence of the panel, it sounds like a typical piece of litigation. But behind this bare narrative lies another story, as full of
strange personalities, unlikely arguments, and philosophical puzzles
as Umberto Eco's, The Name of the Rose2 -a book about semiology
masquerading as a murder mystery.
Since the editors of the law review have unwisely given me carte
blanche in writing this essay, I want to concentrate on this second
narrative, the strange subtext that lies under the Shakespeare story,
and to link it to current philosophical and literary concerns about
the reading of texts. Seen this way, the Shakespeare debate is an
example of something we also find in arguments over "the Original
Intent of the Framers"-an attempt to give epistemological precedence to one particular reading of the historical and textual record.
The interesting difference is that constitutional scholarship uses the
intention of the authors to identify the meaning of the text, while
much of the Shakespeare scholarship uses the meaning of the text to
"identify" the author-and not just by name. In both cases, however, we find the phenomenon described by Foucault in the quotation which heads this essay-the use of the Author as the principle
of thrift in the production of meaning, a device that limits and disciplines the range of meanings to be found in the text.
Just as the "Intent of the Framers" is used as an argumentative
device to limit the range of interpretations of the Constitution, so
the Shakespearean biographies seek to invent a richly detailed picture of the author, a picture which can then be used to constrain the
interpretation of the very works from whence it was drawn. At the
same time the biographer may even be able to use "Shakespeare" as
a cheerleader for some particular opinion about politics, sexuality,
you name it. (And they have.) For those who cannot believe the
biographies thus constructed, why there is always the option of substituting for the mysterious William Shakespeare some other author
about whom we do know a great deal, such as Edward de Vere, or
Queen Elizabeth, or Bacon, or Marlowe, or... Both sides, in other
2.

U. Eco, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (1983).

1988]

THE SEARCH FOR AN AUTHOR

627

words, seem driven to construct or discover a definite author who
will then give definite meaning to the work, in just the same way as
the Framers are thought to give a definite meaning to the Constitution. In this essay, I will explore this beguiling similarity. My argument is that the Shakespeare debate has much to tell us about
attitudes to textual indeterminacy and to the romantic picture of the
author on which so much of our interpretive tradition-both constitutional and literary-depends.

I
When the Shakespeare debate was first proposed to me, I had
only the haziest knowledge of the arcane world of Shakespeare
"claimants." I knew a little more about Shakespearean scholarship
generally, and had an interest in the world of Elizabethan professional playwrights. Being by disposition an aspiring iconoclast, I
was sympathetic to the idea that the traditional learning might be
wrong and receptive to the idea that a scholarly consensus can be
repressive as well as enlightening. I am sorry to say that I found the
various attempts to dethrone William Shakespeare as the true author and to crown any one of fifty-six claimants in his stead, to be
almost entirely without merit as investigations into historical fact.
But what they lacked as assertions of historical truth, they more than
made up in the richness and depth of their rhetorical structure, their
baroque assemblies of circular arguments, their obsessive and recurrent themes of conspiracy and foul-play, their superlative ability
to explain away inconvenient evidence, their ahistorical and romantic conception of authorship, and finally their beneficial effect in getting the Shakespearean orthodoxy to reconsider its own fanciful
historiography. What is more, some of the Stratfordian scholarship
shared the same faults. In fact, it seemed to display an identical
structure. It is on this structure that I wish to concentrate. Thus, I
must advise those who wish to concentrate on the debate tout seul to
turn directly to the briefs. In this introductory article I will be exploring not the debate over a fact, but the morphology of an obsession-the obsession with Shakespeare's author-ity.
As part of my preparation for the debate, I read a great deal written by "the heretics"-the revealing name given to those who do
not think that the actor from Stratford wrote the plays. There are
some fifty-six claimants to Shakespeare's throne 3 -some of whom
are supposed to have worked alone, while others are supposed to
3. See H.

GIBSON, THE SHAKESPEARE CLAIMANTS

(1962).
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have collaborated in the most unlikely assemblies. Each champion
for a claimant generally begins with a short autobiographical description of how he or she came to doubt that Shakespeare was truly
the author. Almost without exception, the reason cited is the lack of
fit between William Shakespeare's life and "Shakespeare's" works.
They express surprise that we know so little about Shakespeare's
life. Surely a transcendental genius would have left us more
records? They express surprise at the kinds of records that he did
leave us. Surely a great artist would not have been as interested in
the getting and making of money? After all, we all know that great
art is inimical to commerce and worldly concerns. They express
surprise over the fact that Shakespeare apparently committed the
sin we call plagiarism. Surely a great artist would not have stooped
to copy the works of his inferiors? They express surprise that
Shakespeare did not seek greater control over his own works; some
of them being published without his name and apparently without
his consent. Surely, nothing is more important to a great artist than
to control the rights to and the attribution of his own works? Finally, they express surprise that Shakespeare had a command over
such a wide range of information. Where did he get the opportunity
to load up with all of this (to our eyes, arcane) knowledge, before
spilling out in the plays?
I think that it is in this part of the debate that we get the clearest
view of the conception of the author that animates both the heretical
and the more extreme Stratfordian works-the latter being traditionally and revealingly referred to as "bardolatrous," because they
construct an idolatry around the bard. In fact, I would like to make
the claim that most of the debate over who wrote "Shakespeare's"
works really reduces itself to a debate over different conceptions of
authorship. 4 Both the heretical and the bardolatrous theories depend on a vision of authorship which I shall call the romantic vision. 5 In the romantic vision art (and authorship in particular) is
4. Professor Marjorie Garber was, to my knowledge, the first person to raise this issue
in connection with the debate over the identity of "William Shakespeare." I am enormously
indebted to her essay, Shakespeare's Ghost Writers, in CANNIBALS, WITCHES AND DIVORCE: EsTRANGING THE RENAISSANCE (M. Garber ed. 1987). Apart from the Foucauldian perspective

suggested here, Professor Garber also traces out a fascinating series of subplots within the
debates-including the attempt by Americans to bring Shakespeare to the New World by discovering his "true" identity. I cannot recommend her work highly enough.
5. I pick this term because it has many of the connotations central to the popular conception of authorship. For background to the discussion see Foucault, supra note 1; Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright. Economic and Legal Considerations of the Emergence of the
"Author", 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984); see also J. RALPH, THE CASE OF Av-

(1758); P. SHEAVYN, THE LITERARY PROFESSION IN THE ELIZABETHAN AGE (1909); Darnton, A Police Inspector Sorts His Files: The Anatomy of the Republic of
Letters, in R. DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL
THORS BY PROFESSION OR TRADE
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inimical to commercial concerns. The writer does not write for
money, nor is she interested in anything other than the perfection of
her work. The author is presumed to have an almost transcendental
insight-something which cuts beneath the mundane world of
everyday appearance. This transcendental insight or genius plays a
very important role in establishing the author as the ruler of the
text. It "goes without saying" that the author's interpretation governs because it is the author's genius, the author's special knowledge, which created this piece of art ex nihilo. Similarly, the
argument for original intent relies in part on the idea of the Founding Fathers as both literal and figurative "authors" of the Country.
Thus, their understanding of the Constitution should govern us, not
only because of their role as creative genii, but because-"by convention"-an author's interpretation is the "governing" one.
The romantic conception of authorship gives the author more
than mere interpretive control over the work. In many Western
countries, (though not in most parts of the USA) copyright laws go
so far as to recognize the author's "moral rights" to control a work.
"Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. ' 6 So
deeply rooted is our sense that art and authorship are different than
other kinds of market transactions, that it is difficult to realize how
striking a provision this really is. Could we imagine giving a
plumber a control over the pipes she installs even after the work is
paid for, or a cabinet maker the right to veto the conversion of her
writing desk into a television cabinet? 7 The author is different than
other workers, is outside the ordinary world of work and exchange,
precisely because of her romantic status. In only one other area, the
family, does our society have a similar romanticism, a similar anticommercialism, a similar commitment to non-instrumental relationships. And, like the family, the author's work provides us with a
"haven in a heartless world."" How terrible it would be then, to find
that the greatest author of all was a professional playwright who
HISTORY 145, 162-63 (1984); C. DAVIDSON, REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: THE RISE OF THE
NOVEL IN AMERICA (1986).
6. Article 6 bis, Berne Convention, W.I.P.O. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION

41 (1978).
7. Well, admittedly, some of us can imagine such a world. See Marx, Estranged Labour, in
lH

MARx-ENGELs READER 56 (R. Tucker ed. 1972).
8. See C. L~scn, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977). For a fascinating account that
arguably fuses the romantic conception of the author and the romantic conception'of the
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knocked out scripts for money, and made canny investments of the
proceeds. How bizarre it would be if, while showing great concern
over the management of his real estate, Shakespeare did not protest
pirated, corrupt, or unauthorized versions of his work. 9
Finally the author is indulgently expected to have a character, a
temperament, and a genius that put her outside of society, just as
the Founders are conceived as being outside of, being prior to politics, which is something that goes on inside the structure they have
created. This peculiar outsider's status confers an unusual power
upon the author's subjectivity. The author is seen as the individual
par excellence. "The coming into being of the notion of 'author' constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of
ideas, knowledge, literature and the sciences."' 0 Society is supposed to allow the author more subjectivity than the average person. She may be eccentric or violate cultural norms. Her genius is
seen as individual rather than being the product of a culture or a
context. To understand the work we concentrate most of our attention on the author, rather than on the learning of the time, the gossip of the streets, the influences of the genre. The work comes from
inside the author. At best, we may concede that this particular author
is fitted by breeding and education to be its enunciator. And if we
do not stress the importance of culture and context to the formation
of the romantic author's work, still less do we even entertain the
notion that she could possibly have taken any of her work from the
work of others. The romantic author may violate the norms of sexu.ality, decorum, and social propriety, but never the norms of literary
property. How horrific then, to think that the greatest author of
them all would "borrow" freely from the works of his
contemporaries. I
The romantic conception of authorship should seem familiar. Today it dominates popular conceptions of the "great writer." What is
more, we project it back through history, we universalize it. Not
only do we think this is the way that authors are now, we think it is
family see Darnton, Readers Respond to Rousseau; The Fabincation of Romantic Sensitivity, in R.
DARNTON, supra note 5, at 215.
9. For a discussion of these "anomalies" compare Appellant's Brief at pp. 680-81 with
Appellee's Brief at 769-70.
10. Foucault, supra note 1, at 141.
11. "With Elizabethans, stories, ideas, even phrases, were regarded as common literary
property which anyone could translate or adapt." K. HOLZNECHT, BACKGROUNDS OF SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS (1950), quoted in Appellee's Brief at n.108. Compare this to a typical Oxfordian reaction. "I have rejected the contention of the Stratfordians, insulting to the peerless
dramatist and unreasonable on its face, that Shakespeare stooped to cribbing the grossly inferior work of others." C. OGBURN, THE MYSTERIOUS WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 449 (1984). If
this isiI't an ahistorical vision of authorship, it is hard to imagine what would count as one.
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the way they have always been. But this conception of the status of
authorship, of the relationship of art to commerce, of literary property, of the illegitimacy of "borrowing" from other works-is actually a comparatively modern one. It would certainly have been alien
to Shakespeare. It would be both presumptuous and ridiculous to
attempt here a complete history of the concept of authorship,
although one is definitely needed. Nevertheless, a series of historical snapshots may suffice to show the historical contingency of our
present ideas about the relationship of authorship to genius, interpretation, control, and commerce.
In medieval Europe authorship did not have the preeminent importance or the significance we accord to it today. The early Church
writers, who were also the guardians of literacy, saw literary and
philosophical creation as a less important task than that of preserving the wisdom of the ancients.
They valued extant old books more highly than any recent
elucubrations and they put the work of the scribe and the copyist above
that of the authors. The real task of the scholars in their view was
not the vain excogitation of novelties but a discovery of great old
books, their multiplication and the placing of copies where they
2
would be accessible to future generations of readers.'
To the extent that literature became a pastime of noble courtiers,
the idea of a permanent "work of art" remained foreign to the
genre. "Even the courtiers themselves seem dubious about these
kinds of literature outside the limits of the intimate circles for which
they were primarily intended: maybe the art is too frivolous to deserve the permanence of print."' 13 At the same time the fact that the
literature was aimed at a small circle of courtiers meant that it was
seen as communal property, making the modern ideas of individual
production, control, and ownership doubly inappropriate.' 4 Ironically, these are the best arguments Oxfordians have so far put forward to explain Edward de Vere's "failure" to acknowledge
Shakespeare's works as his own, although they will need to jettison
some of their beloved conspiracy theories to make these arguments
credible. Yet once one accepts the fact that authorship was seen
differently in Elizabethan times, one cannot excoriate poor Will for
his failure to live up to another era's concept of literary creation.
What one gains on the roundabout one loses on the swings.
12.

E.P.

GOLDSCHMIDT, MEDIEVAL TEXTS AND THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN PRINT

112

(1943), quoted in J. SAUNDERS, THE PROFESSION OF ENGLISH LETTERS 20 (1964) (emphasis
added).
13. J. SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 60.
14.

Id. at 46.
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How was the author-and in particular the playwright-seen during the period that Shakespeare was writing? The best evidence
suggests that the closest contemporary parallel may be to the early
history of the film industry.1 5 There one finds a group of working
professionals who knocked out film after film, collaborating, "borrowing" from each other, viewing themselves as journeymen and
women who were laboring together to develop a new (and profitable) craft. In retrospect their films have been granted the status of
"works of art"-a concept with connotations which would probably
have been alien to the understanding the people involved had of
their own products, just as it would have been alien to Elizabethan
playwrights. 16 Admittedly, Elizabethan authors hoped for an improved social and intellectual status. 17 So, I am sure, did filmmakers. But the wish is not the reality, and "an improved status" is
not necessarily the particular status we now give to authors and
works of art. Indeed, well after the Renaissance, there is evidence
that the author was just seen as one of the many people who labored
together to produce a book. Martha Woodmansee illustrates this
point with the entry on "Books" from the Allgemeines Oeconomisches
Lexicon, published in 1753.
Book, either numerous sheets of white paper that have been
stitched together in such a way that they can be filled with writing;
or, a highly useful and convenient instrument constructed of
printed sheets variously bound in cardboard, paper, vellum,
leather, etc. for presenting the truth to another in such a way that
it can be conveniently read and recognized. Many people work on
this ware before it is complete and becomes an actual book in this
sense. The scholar and the writer, the papermaker, the type
founder, the typesetter and the printer, the proofreader, the publisher, the book binder, sometimes even the gilder and the brassworker, etc. Thus many mouths are fed by this branch of
manufacture. 18
Professor Woodmansee points out that the Renaissance vision of
authorship was a strange combination of the notion of "craft" and
15. This vision comes from lengthy talks with PeterJaszi whose expertise in early American film is not easily cited. I suggest THE CINEMA BOOK 2-8, 114-206 (P. Cook ed. 1985): B.
HARPER-FUSSELL, MABEL 53 & passim (1982).
16. lam not disputing the quality of Elizabethan theatre and early American film. merel
pointing out that if we cram them into the Procrustean bed of our romantic conception of
art-the great work conceived by the great author-we lose any real understanding of how
these cultural artifacts were actually produced.
17. J. SAUNDERS, supra note 12, at 80.
18. G. ZINCK, ALLGEMEINES OECONOMIscHEs LEXICON col. 442 (1753), quoted m Wood-

mansee, supra note 5, at 425. I am grateful to my colleague PeterJaszi for drawing my attention to this excellent essay.
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inspiration. Both craft and inspiration were external-the craft consisted of applying a body of received learning and the inspiration
came from the deity or the muse. In this "compound model" the
element of "individuation" of which Foucault speaks is absent; the
work comes from outside of the author, from the culture or the
Gods.
Eighteenth-century theorists departed from this compound model
of writing in two significant ways. They minimized the element of
craftsmanship (in some instances they simply discarded it) in favor
of the element of inspiration, and they internalised the source of
that inspiration. That is, inspiration came to be regarded as emanating not from outside or above, but from within the writer himself. "Inspiration" came to be explicated in terms of original
genius, with the consequence that the inspired work was made peculiarly and distinctively the product-and the property-of the
writer.19
It is the application of this eighteenth-century notion-with its romantic, anti-commercial overtones-to Shakespeare's sixteenth and
seventeenth-century works that manages to cloud the waters so
thoroughly.
Most of the heretical theorists and the bardolators are not literary
scholars or historians. They are lawyers, doctors, journalists-people skilled in argument-who make the understandable mistake of
assuming that the romantic conception of authorship really expresses a timeless truth about Art, rather than a 200 year-old stereotype. Applying their ahistorical stereotype to Shakespeare's life,
they find-surprise, surprise-that it does not fit. For the bardolators the answer is simply that we sail off into the world of fantasy.
For the heretics the answer is that a new author must therefore be
found, one whose life and attitudes have a closer fit to the romantic
conception of the author. Both groups, "knowing" that they are
right, produce a set of arguments which confirm themselves even as
one watches.
II
There is another, deeper implication to be drawn from this potted
history of authorship. Many of our assumptions about the interpretation of texts depend on the romantic conception. The author's
intent is the real meaning because the author's genius created this
work out of nothing. As I pointed out earlier, the Founding Fathers
are seen as both literal and figurative "authors" of the Country, the
19.

Woodmansee, supra note 5, at 427 (footnote omitted).
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people who created a structure ex nihilo. The romantic conception
tells us that the author's intent is qualitatively different from otherderivative, partial, political-interpretations of the work. The same
claim is made for the intent of the Framers. The romantic vision
ascribes to the author a temperament, insight, and genius that put
her outside of society. The Founders are conceived as being outside
of, as being the architects of, this society. Politics goes on inside the
structure they have created, but the structure itself is seen as fixed
by their will and our (tacit) acceptance of it. The list of similarities
could be extended and extended. Yet under an older view, authors-whether constitutional or literary-are not seen as transcendental genii, but as the nodal points at which craft and divine
inspiration converge. Such a view might have interesting consequences for constitutional theory. Perhaps the Constitution we have
given our tacit consent to is not the one in the minds of the men at
Philadelphia but the one in the minds of the theorists from whose
ideas they borrowed, or the one that succeeding generations have
believed they were living by, or the one we choose to make out of
the conflicting traditions they left us. Perhaps it is some combination of all of these. In any event, once one challenges the romantic
conception of authorship, all kinds of things start to happen.
So far, I have argued that it is the romantic conception of authorship that makes Shakespeare's identity appear to be a puzzle. Yet
there are many apparent puzzles in the world. Why does this one
attract such obvious passion from its devotees? Again, I think that
the answer is linked to the romantic conception of the author, but
this time it is linked more to the relationship we assume between the
intention of the author and the meaning of his work. This is the
point at which I see the closest parallel between the debate over
Shakespeare's authorship and the debate over the interpretation of
the Constitution according to the "Original Intent of the Framers."
Like the Constitution, Shakespeare's oeuvre presents us with an
astounding range of possible meanings. Is Hamlet an Oedipal psychodrama, an existentialist tragedy, an attack on Machiavellian court
intrigue, or a blood and thunder melodrama with a particularly inept hero? When the first amendment says no law shall abridge, does
it mean no law? Is Shylock a convenient textual device to express
anti-semitic feeling or a hero who cries out against the prejudice of
his world? Does the fourteenth amendment require us to desegregate schools, or merely to give all children separate but equal educations? This kind of indeterminacy makes people extremely
uncomfortable. Faced with such a range of possible interpretations,
our first instinct is to turn to the intention of the author. We say
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that the text means what the author meant it to, and thus we limit
the text's indeterminacy, its range of meanings.
There is a strange irony here. As I pointed out earlier, one of the
reasons that it seems iormal to concede to the author the power to
rule the interpretation of the text is that the romantic vision portrays
the author as a transcendent genius, full of limitless inventiveness.
Yet here the author's main function seems to be as a device to limit
and restrict the meaning of the text. Foucault describes this process
in the article which I quoted at the beginning of this essay.
The author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous
proliferation of significations within a world where one is thrifty
not only with one's resources and riches, but also with one's discourses and their significations. The author is the principle of
thrift in the proliferation of meaning. As a result we must entirely
reverse the traditional idea of the author. We are accustomed, as
we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator
of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity,
an inexhaustible world of significations. We are used to thinking
that the author is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely. The truth is
quite the contrary: The author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the
works, he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture,
one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes
the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition,
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual
surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author
is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite
20
of his historically real function.
This still leaves us with an important question. Shouldn't the interpretation of a play be governed by the author's intention? One set
of objections concerns the other possibilities. Perhaps we should
interpret texts as they would be understood by some real or imaginary community of readers. Or perhaps we should take the words at
face value (whatever that means), only turning to some other interpretive criteria when this one runs out. Or perhaps we should interpret texts so as to give effect to some overriding goal-such as
economic efficiency for law, or the development of the genre for
literature-seeing each word as a mere placeholder for the end we
20. Foucauh, supra note I, at 158-59.
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have in mind. Each of these ideas has had many a polysyllable devoted to its theoretical background (for example, are there essential
meanings to words?) as well as to its practical problems (for example, who defines the relevant community of readers?). Each theory
can subsume or be subsumed by any of the others. For example,
you can't decide the goal of your interpretation without having
some audience in mind, but in order to delimit the audience you
need to postulate some goal.
Authorial intent has all of the same problems-as any literary biographer or lawyer researching congressional intent can testify.
Again, the problems are both practical and theoretical. The practical problems concern the "when," "where," "how," and "which"
questions about interpretation. Is Kafka's desire to have Max Brod
burn his books part of his authorial intent? Does the corruptly
bought vote of a legislator form part of the congressional intent?
The theoretical problems concern the "why" questions. For example, why should we say authorial intent governs when the concept of
intent cannot be easily understood without reference to some
imagined audience-even if it is an internal one? Why should we
think the author's intent governs when an older conception presents
the author as the nodal point at which the received learning and the
muses' dictates make themselves concrete? Why not cast our interpretive nets back into the culture from which the work sprang, or
forward into the audience that now receives it? To explain the full
background to all of these interpretive theories would take hundreds of pages. I have neither the time nor the talent necessary to
weave the whole tangled web, but I think I can make at least a
couple of points without doing so.
There are so many problems with the theory of authorial intent,
and we turn so frequently to other methods of interpretation, that
the dominance of the theory cannot be explained by reference to its
accuracy. 21 To understand its appeal we must turn to the image that
it conjures up, the image I described in the section on the romantic
conception of authorship. The image is of a self-willed, autonomous, creative individual who maintains control over the fruits of
her labor. This is not merely a literary convention, it is a utopian
political ideal familiar from the works of writers from Locke to
Marx. Of course, when one appeals to the intent of the author, one
conjures up not merely the romantic conception of the great writer,
but also a much more common sense idea about the person who is
21. But see Nehamas, What an Author Is, 83JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 685 (1986); Nehamas,
The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 133 (1981).
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most likely to understand a text. Yet both the common sense and
the romantic ideas resonate strongly with our utopian visions. In
the Marxist vision of society as well as in the Byronic vision of authorship the romantic idea of making history with will and consciousness is balanced by the more prosaic goal of achieving control
over one's own labor. At the same time there is also a powerful
appeal to our subliminal desires for author-itarian control. We will
not have to make any hard decisions because the author has made
all of the necessary choices already. Peter Gabel calls this syndrome
22
in constitutional jurisprudence "Founding Father knows best."
Thus, the theory of authorial intent gives the appearence of being
both romantic and pragmatic, common sense and philosophically
sophisticated, emancipatory and authoritarian, property and antiestablishment. Small wonder that it seems to be a qualitatively superior mode of interpretation. Like Walt Whitman, it contains
multitudes.
Lawyers are familiar with the range of moral, practical, and conceptual problems presented by the theory of authorial intent. Mr.
Meese's Justice Department argues that the interpretation of the
Constitution should be governed by the intentions of the small
group of white males who created the text. It is pointed out that this
type of interpretation is frequently historically uncertain, practically
indeterminate, politically repugnant, conceptually incoherent, and
contraindicated by the evidence that the Framers' intent was that the
Framers' intent should not bind future generations.2 3 If we brush
aside these trifling objections, how does all of this relate to the
Shakespeare debate?
If one wishes to limit the indeterminacy of Shakespeare's texts by
interpreting them according to the author's intentions, one runs
into two major difficulties; one theoretical, one practical. The theoretical difficulty is the question of whether an author's intention
should govern the interpretation of the author's work. From what I
have just been arguing it seems to me that the answer is that authorial intent is at best one of a grab-bag of interpretive methods, none
of which can claim unique correctness. But let us assume for a moment that we accept the correctness of the theory. The practical
difficulty is more down to earth. We know so little about the intimate details of William Shakespeare's life. We wish to know more
about what he thought, what he dreamed of, his relations with his
22.

Gabel, Founding Father Knows Best 2 TxKKUN 41 (1986).
See generally Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: .4Citique of Inteipretationand .Vetral Principles.
86 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
23.
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loved ones, his interests, background, schooling, and so on. Without this kind of detailed picture (and perhaps even with it) how
could we know the real meaning of the plays and poems? At the
moment a question mark hangs behind the works. We wish that we
could subsitute for this question mark a person fully detailed in
every part. From the wish to the deed is but a short step.
The road now leads in three different directions. Frustrated by
this dearth of information, Shakespearean popularizers construct
the persona from the texts and then use this constructed persona to
interpret the plays they have just been mining for clues. Lawyers
are very familiar with this "procedure." Admittedly, it may seem a
trifle circular (as indeed it is), but what it lacks in methodological
coherence it makes up in illusory but comforting certainty. In the
next section I will give an example of the things that can be done
with this kind of interpretive method.
On the second fork of the road are the heretics. Similarly frustrated by the lack of information, their solution is to substitute for
William Shakespeare another person about whom we know more.
In fact, the one quality shared by all fifty-six alternate candidates for
Shakespeare's title is that we know more about them than we do
about the unromantic actor and theatrical entrepreneur from Stratford on Avon. It seems that any kind of biographical determinacy,
no matter how wildly unlikely, is preferable to an author about
whom we know next to nothing. With the new author in place, the
texts can be reinterpreted. In the Oxfordian version it turns out
that the farcical bedroom substitutions of one woman for another
must be events from de Vere's own life, the fuel for Hamlet is de
24
Vere's own resentment against Burleigh, and so on.
The third fork of the road is probably the least travelled, although
perhaps the most interesting. Might we not like our authors to be
faceless and featureless? Might we not prefer to have Shakespeare
as a mystery, his character unrecorded, or his identity actually unknown? My favorite passage on the subject comes from Sartre.
Nevertheless, I had to be told about authors. My grandfather told
me, tactfully, calmly. He taught me to recite the list to myself,
from Hesiod to Hugo, without a mistake. They were the Saints
and Prophets. Charles Schweitzer said he worshipped them. Yet
they bothered him. Their obstrusive presence prevented him
from attributing the works of Man directly to the Holy Ghost. He
therefore felt a secret preference for the anonymous, for the
24. For the general form of the argument see J. LOONEY, SHAKESPEARE IDENTIFIED IN
EDWARD DE VERE, SEVENTEENTH EARL OF OXFORD, AND THE POEMS OF EDWARD DE VERE. 135-

245 (1949); C. OGBURN, supra note 11, at 359-60, 365-72, 488-91, 575-76, 613-14.
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builders who had had the modesty to keep in the background of
their cathedrals, for the countless authors of popular songs. He
did not mind Shakespeare, whose identity was not established.
Nor Homer, for the same reason. Nor a few others, about whom
there was no certainty they had ever existed. As for those who
had not wished or had been unable to efface the traces of their
25
life, he found excuses, provided they were dead.
Both Henry James and Borges have written stories in which a different version of this idea features. In James' The Birthplace2 6 a man
becomes the caretaker of Shakespeare's birthplace. At first, he tries
to tell the visitors that we know nothing about Shakespeare.
It's all I want-to let the author alone. Practically'-he felt himself
getting the last of his chance-'there is no author; that is for us to
deal with. There are all the immortal people-in the work; but
there's nobody else.' "27 He meets with a uniform hostility to this
idea. Finally, he starts to make up anecdotes giving complete, and
completely spurious, details of Shakespeare's private life. His audiences are enthralled, his salary is raised-all as payment for refusing
to "let the author alone."
This theme is repeated in Borges's story, Everything and Nothing.
This Shakespeare has acted many parts, but has never had a self-a
core. He speaks of this to God, but Borges' God is a modernist.
"Neither am I anyone; I have dreamt the world as you dreamt your
work, my Shakespeare, and among the forms in my dream are you,
who like myself are many and no-one." 28
III
Leaving the beguiling notion of an eternally indefinite Shakespeare, let us return to our main theme. I have argued that the
Oxfordians start with the romantic conception of the author, reject
William Shakespeare because he does not fit it, substitute for him a
person who does fit the image and whose life is nearly contemporaneous, and thus dispell the threatening question mark that hangs
behind the works. Edward de Vere's persona is not only knowable
but known, and the plays become a vaguely disguised version of the
25. J. SARTRE, THE WORDS 61-62 (1964). I offer this as my modest contribution to the
heretics, for their collection of quotations showing that famous people have doubted Shakespeare's authorship.
26. James, The Birthplace, 17 THE NEW YORK EDITION OF HENRY JAMES 129 (1909).

27. Id. at 180.
28. Everything and Nothing, inJ.L. BORGES, LABYRINTHS 249 (1964). The best source for
different views of Shakespeare is S. SCHOENBAUM, SHAKESPEARE'S LIVES (1970), which is not a
biography of Shakespeare, but a biography of his biographers. After reading Professor
Schoenbaum's work, it is clear that everyone 'finds' the author for whom they were searching.
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author's own life. This reading manages simultaneously to exalt individualism, the nobility, ahistorical interpretation, and the use of
the Author as "the principle of thrift in the production of meaning."
Mr. Meese would be proud. But it would hardly be fair to concentrate only on the heretical and bardolatrous scholarship. I will turn
now to those whose "search for the author" consists of their attempt
to enlist Shakespeare's transcendental genius in support of their
own vision of life, the state, or sexuality. Again there is a close relationship between the attempt to capture Shakespeare and the romantic conception of authorship. In fact, he is worth "capturing"
precisely because of the qualities which the romantic conception of
the author ascribes to him. After all, if Shakespeare believed it, it
must be true.
I will use as an example that eminent popularizer of the Elizabethan period, Mr. A.L. Rowse and his revealingly titled biography,
Shakespeare the Man.29 As we will see, there are some indications that
the last word of the title should be in capital letters.
If we accept the romantic conception of the author, then the opinions and predilections of the author assume an unusual importance.
After all, if the author is a transcendental genius surely we should
give extra weight to his ideas, his political beliefs, even his sexual
orientation. Now, some-perhaps most-readers of the Sonnets
have found in them fairly strong homoerotic overtones. If many of
the addresses to the fair youth seem to smack of the love that dare
not speak its name, should we therefore conclude that Shakespeare
was . . .? Mr. Rowse is quick to disabuse us of the idea that we
should give the sanction of the Great Author to gay love. In fact,
almost every time that Shakespeare's bawdiness is mentioned Mr.
Rowse reassures(?) us that we should not draw any conclusions
about the breadth of the bard's sexual enthusiasm. "Shakespeare is
the bawdiest of the Elizabethan dramatists, with the natural bawdy
of the highly sexed normal heterosexual.... "30 Even when we might be
thinking of something other than sexual preference-such as the
poetry, for example-Mr. Rowse manages to retrieve our straying
attention with his subtle commentary.
"Past cure I am now, now reason is past care,
And frantic-mad with evermore unrest" 3'
This is what sex can do for highly sexed heterosexuals. In case we
might have missed the fact that SHAKESPEARE WAS A HETERO29.
30.
31.

A.L. ROWSE, SHAKESPEARE THE MAN (1973).
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 97.
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SEXUAL Mr. Rowse quotes some of the bawdier passages from the
sonnets and reminds(?) us that "[i]t is a well known psychological
phenomenon that homosexuals do not go in for this kind of
32
bawdiness."
Well, one lives and learns. Finally, lest we think it was only the
playwrights who were butch, Mr. Rowse manages to get in some
words about the audience. The following example comes in the
middle of a reproof he aims at the Victorians for their censure of the
brothel scenes in Pericles. "[T]he bawdy is natural and would appeal
33
to an Elizabethan audience, neither incestuous nor homosexual."
With Mr. Rowse it is never terribly easy to tell, but I assume that the
last two adjectives refer to the audience rather than the bawdy. Am
I wrong then, to detect an implied judgement about the characteristics of today's theatre audiences? Perhaps I digress.
In Mr. Rowse's hands Shakespeare not only lends his author-ity to
heterosexuality, he also provides a justification for social hierarchy.
Mr. Rowse relies most heavily on Coriolanus to make his point.
In his play Shakespeare concentrates on the issues of dearth of
corn, class-conflict, the pros and cons of peace or war, all beating
against the rock-like figure of a war-hero who cannot adapt himself to peace, let alone democracy and democratic humbug. Some
humbug is a necessary element in a society, a kind of cement helping to keep it together; but if all is humbug-one thinks of the
34
1930s, before the war, and again ever since-society falls apart.
Having quoted other passages from Coriolanus and Antony and Cleopatra to show that Shakespeare thought the mob contemptible, the
people incapable of operating without direction, Mr. Rowse sums
up in the following way.
[T]he whole intellectual leadership, at any rate all the half-baked
intellectuals in control of the mass media of democratic society,
are bent on courses utterly contrary to honesty and common
sense, contrary to the facts of human nature and society, victims
of their own illusions and the propagators of lies. It is not true,
and it never has been true, that men are essentially reasonable,
non-violent, infinitely educable, and that they can be left to govern themselves by their own sweet will. The consequences of the
inculcation of these delusions are to be seen on every hand in
democratic society today. As if William Shakespeare, than whom
no man has ever understood more thoroughly, was wrong and su35
perficial liberal intellectuals right!
32.
33.
34.
35.
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I am struck particularly by the explicit use of Shakespeare's genius
to buttress the argument against social equality. This is, literally, an
argument from author-ity. Shakespeare the great author had this
opinion and this "fact," is a sufficient warrant of the opinion's truth.
Substitute "the Framers" for Shakespeare and "binding quality" for
truth and you have the theory of Original Intent. But the similarities go beyond mere methodological agreement; there seems to be
some agreement about politics too. In conclusion, Mr. Rowse has
this to say about "[t]he cult of the common man." "[It] is the greatest enemy of incentive, quality, achievement; in itself it is a lie-as
the people themselves well know-and its propagation eats away the
heart-strings that hold society together. '3 6 By themselves, Mr.
Rowse's political opinions might not carry much weight. (Might we
say the same about Mr. Meese?) Popularizing historians and literary
biographers are not normally thought of as the most perspicacious
of political observers. (Might we say the same about Attorneys General?) But because of his status as a literary scholar we will probably
grant Mr. Rowse's interpretation of Shakespeare a certain authority.
And if Shakespeare (rather than Mr. Rowse) is against social egalitarianism, (and is very, very heterosexual)... well, this is a dark lady of a
different color entirely. Interestingly, Mr. Meese's Framers also
seem to be against social egalitarianism. They even seem to be very,
very heterosexual. No doubt this is just a coincidence.
CONCLUSION

I started this essay with a quotation from Michel Foucault-a man
whose historical generalizations would be completely insufferable if
they weren't so often correct. I finish the essay convinced that a lot
more historical and philosophical work needs to be done on this
notion of an author. The notion has its repressive side, its willingness to cede control to the (supposed) will of some unseen presence-"Founding Father knows best." This may be the most
striking parallel between the Shakespeare debate and constitutional
jurisprudence. But the notion of the author also has its
emancipatory side. The very attractiveness of the idea of "the author" springs from the vision it conjures up-making history with
will and consciousness, engaging in fulfilling, creative labor, not reducing everything to the universal logic of the money relation, keeping control over the objects one produces. This sounds like Marx
36.

Id. at 225.
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writing about alienated Labor as well as Kant writing about the
universality of the Subject.
Finally, there is the eerie resemblance between the romantic conception of the author and the romantic conception of the family.
Both art and the family come to be seen as a source of immortality, a
non-instrumental arena for passionate self-expression, a haven from
the pressures of commerce and so on. My suggestion is that-if we
trace out the historical development of these ideas in their economic
and cultural contexts-we will find a whole series of parallels, even
though the reality that is supposed to be "represented" by these
conceptions is actually very different (and much more complicated).
Where all of this might lead I do not know, but I would like to suggest that it might lead us to a "political economy of our metaphysics;" a way of understanding the historical genesis of the
fundamental notions (public/private; art/commerce; intentional/accidental) with which we structure our world. The history of
authorship bids fair to be the first part in this study. But that is for
another article. Where does all of this leave poor Will?
Take your pick. The authoritarian, bawdy, and fiercely heterosexual playwright beloved of Professor Rowse, the transcendental genius who rises amidst choirs of angels, the professional Elizabethan
playwright obsessed by language, hammering away at his craft and
incidentally creating something that has lasted long beyond the
world in which the works originated, the question mark hanging just
out of sight behind the plays, the riddle wrapped in a mystery
wrapped inside an enigma. Is he the Earl of Oxford? Francis Bacon? Queen Elizabeth herself? The struggle continues, the arguments looping back through the texts to confirm themselves in the
minds of their progenitors, providing us with a veritable treasury of
circular reasoning and self-validating theories. Arguments over the
intent of the Framers pale in comparison. The factions struggle to
restore determinacy or indeterminacy to the texts, to show that the
plays give the sanction of genius to social hierarchy or that the sonnets are a hymn to a lust unbesmirched by homoeroticism. Do the
arguments that follow address the question, "Who was Shakespeare?" Yes they do although, as I have tried to show, they are far
from alone in their attempt to capture Shakespeare. But Shakespeare remains undepicted, uncaptured-and so... gentle "Reader
37
looke, not on his Picture, but his Booke."

37. BenJonson. To The Reade. in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 58 (G.B. Evans ed. 1974).

